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Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 2002 22(1):115-134; doi:10.1093/ojls/22.1.115
© 2002 by Oxford University Press
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The Contractual Nexus: Is Reliance Essential?

Paul Mitchell1 and John Phillips1

1 King's College London

This article challenges the generally accepted dogma that reliance is an essential ingredient in contractual formation. We argue that this view has resulted from an erroneous interpretation of the relevant case law, failure to cite contrary authority, and the elevation of often oblique judicial references to the need for reliance to the status of fundamental contractual principle. Contractual theory and clear policy reasons support our position that in English law a contractual obligation subsists when a person, knowing of a promise, performs the stipulated act (or gives the promise) requested by the promisor, even though that person has not relied on the promise.


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