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Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 2002 22(1):91-113; doi:10.1093/ojls/22.1.91
© 2002 by Oxford University Press
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Rights and Participatory Goods

James Morauta1

1 St Catherine's College, Oxford University

Many people think that rights can be held by agents other than individuals—that is, by agents other than individual human beings. But are there any rights which must be held by agents other than individuals, which cannot be held by individuals? In this paper I consider one recent claim of this sort: that a right which is grounded in interests in a participatory good cannot be held by an individual. I call this claim the holding constraint. I examine the two main arguments for the holding constraint, and show that they both fail. In addition to having implications for the theory of group rights, these arguments raise important general issues about the nature of rights and participatory goods.


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