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Oxford Journal of Legal Studies Advance Access originally published online on December 20, 2005
Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 2007 27(2):281-310; doi:10.1093/ojls/gqi039
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© The Author 2005. Published by Oxford University Press. All rights reserved. For permissions, please e-mail: journals.permissions@oxfordjournals.org

Theories of Rights: Is There a Third Way?

Matthew H. Kramer* and Hillel Steiner**

* Professor of Legal & Political Philosophy, Cambridge University, email: mhk11{at}hermes.cam.ac.uk.
** Professor of Political Philosophy, University of Manchester, email: hillel.steiner{at}man.ac.uk.


  Abstract

Some important recent articles, including one in this journal, have sought to devise theories of rights that can transcend the longstanding debate between the Interest Theory and the Will Theory. The present essay argues that those efforts fail and that the Interest Theory and the Will Theory withstand the criticisms that have been levelled against them. To be sure, the criticisms have been valuable in that they have prompted the amplification and clarification of the two dominant theories of rights; but their upshot has been to reveal the need for the improvement, rather than the abandonment, of those theories.


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