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Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 2007 27(3):555-562; doi:10.1093/ojls/gqm010
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© The Author 2007. Published by Oxford University Press. All rights reserved. For permissions, please e-mail: journals.permissions@oxfordjournals.org

Why The Axioms and Theorems of Arithmetic are not Legal Norms

Matthew H. Kramer*

Correspondence: * Professor of Legal & Political Philosophy, University of Cambridge; Fellow of Churchill College, Cambridge. Email: mhkll{at}hermes.cam.ac.uk.


  Abstract

Ronald Dworkin has long criticized legal positivists for their efforts to distinguish between legal and non-legal standards of conduct that are incumbent on people. Recently, Dworkin has broached this criticism in his hostile account of the debates between Incorporationist Legal Positivists and Exclusive Legal Positivists. Specifically, he has maintained that Incorporationists cannot avoid the unpalatable conclusion that the axioms and theorems of arithmetic are legal norms. This article shows why such a conclusion is indeed avoidable and why Dworkin's criticism is therefore wide of the mark.

I am grateful to Mark McBride for some thought-provoking comments on an early version of the central line of reasoning in this article, and to an anonymous OJLS reader for some very helpful comments on a slightly later version.


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