Defending the Possibility of a Neutral Functional Theory of Law
* Assistant Professor of Philosophy, Research Associate Professor of Law, University at Buffalo, State University of New York. Email: kenneth{at}buffalo.edu.
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Abstract |
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I argue that there is methodological space for a functional explanation of the nature of law that does not commit the theorist to a view about the value of that function for society, nor whether law is the best means of accomplishing it. A functional explanation will nonetheless provide a conceptual framework for a better understanding of the nature of law. First I examine the proper role for function in a theory of law and then argue for the possibility of a neutral functional theory, addressing issues raised by Leslie Green, Stephen Perry, Michael Moore and John Finnis.
I am grateful to Jeremy Waldron, Jules Coleman, Stephen Perry, Joseph Raz, Stephanie Beardman, Kenneth Shockley, Christopher Gray, and two anonymous reviewers for comments on earlier drafts.