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Oxford Journal of Legal Studies Advance Access originally published online on June 26, 2009
Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 2009 29(3):481-509; doi:10.1093/ojls/gqp010
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© The Author 2009. Published by Oxford University Press. All rights reserved. For permissions, please e-mail: journals.permissions@oxfordjournals.org

Abstraction and the Rule of Law

William Lucy*

Correspondence: *Law School, University of Manchester, Oxford Rd, Manchester, M13 9PL, UK. Email: William.Lucy{at}manchester.ac.uk.


  Abstract

This article tackles two issues: the nature of law's judgment and what, if anything, might be said in its favour. As to the first issue, the article reminds lawyers of the obvious, namely, that law's judgment is abstract, elucidating both what this entails and why it may be thought problematic. The main burden of the article is to consider what might be said in favour of law's abstract judgment. Only one family of arguments, part of a wider but still not all-encompassing class, are considered here: arguments from the rule of law ideal. Three different arguments from the rule of law are examined, the conclusion being that two of three cannot provide unproblematic and unambiguous support for law's abstract judgment.


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