Oxford Journal of Legal Studies - current issue

Judicial Review Without Rights: Some Problems for the Democratic Legitimacy of Structural Judicial Review

Stone, A. — 2008-03-19

This article addresses an issue overlooked in most of the literature on judicial review: the legitimacy of judicial review of a constitution's federal and structural provisions. Debates about the legitimacy of judicial review—at least as conducted throughout the Commonwealth—are usually focussed on rights. These debates appear to assume that the power of courts like the Australian High Court and the Canadian Supreme Court to interpret and enforce federal and structural provisions is unproblematic. This article tests that assumption and concludes that those who hold democracy-based objections to constitutional rights should seriously reconsider, and perhaps oppose, federal and structural judicial review as well.

Does Dworkin Commit Dworkin's Fallacy?: A Reply to Justice in Robes

Green, M. S. — 2008-03-19

In an article entitled ‘Dworkin's Fallacy, Or What the Philosophy of Language Can't Teach Us about the Law’, I argued that in Law's Empire Ronald Dworkin misderived his interpretive theory of law from an implicit interpretive theory of meaning, thereby committing ‘Dworkin's fallacy’. In his recent book, Justice in Robes, Dworkin denies that he committed the fallacy. As evidence he points to the fact that he considered three theories of law—‘conventionalism’, ‘pragmatism’ and ‘law as integrity’—in Law's Empire. Only the last of these is interpretive, but each, he argues, is compatible with his interpretive theory of meaning, which he describes as the view that ‘the doctrinal concept of law is an interpretive concept’. In this Reply, I argue that Dworkin's argument that he does not commit Dworkin's fallacy is itself an example of the fallacy and that Dworkin's fallacy pervades Justice in Robes just as much as it did Law's Empire.

An Eye for an Eye: Proportionality as a Moral Principle of Punishment

Fish, M. J. — 2008-03-19

The lex talionis of the Old Testament has been widely perceived—understandably, but mistakenly—as a barbaric law of retribution in kind. It is better understood as a seminal expression of restraint and proportionality as moral principles of punishment. This has been recognized from the earliest times. Over the intervening centuries, the lex talionis has lost neither its moral significance nor its penal relevance. This is reflected in H.L.A. Hart's synthesis of modern retributivist and utilitarian theories of punishment and, again, in contemporary Canadian law through the recognition of proportionality as the fundamental principle of sentencing under the Criminal Code. The tension between this fundamental principle and Canada's increasing resort to mandatory minimum sentences of imprisonment is examined briefly in this light.

Damages for Breach of Contract: Compensation, Restitution and Vindication

Pearce, D., Halson, R. — 2008-03-19

In this article we examine the role which vindication plays in contract damages. Vindication describes the making good of a right by the award of an adequate remedy. We argue that, while the primary purpose of compensation is to provide an indemnity for loss, an award of compensatory damages will nevertheless generally vindicate the right to performance of the contract. We go on to consider a distinct measure of damages, vindicatory damages. These, we argue, are neither compensatory nor restitutionary, neither loss-based nor gain-based: they are a rights-based remedy. We then identify various situations in which the courts may be seen to have awarded what are, in substance, vindicatory damages. We conclude by considering the benefits which may follow from recognition of the availability of vindicatory damages as a contract remedy.

Restitution in America: Why the US Refuses to Join the Global Restitution Party

Saiman, C. — 2008-03-19

In the past generation, restitution law has emerged as a global phenomenon. From its Oxbridge home, restitution migrated to the rest of the Commonwealth, and ongoing Europeanization projects have brought the common law of restitution into contact with the Romanist concept of unjust enrichment, further internationalizing this movement. In contrast, in the United States, scholarly interest in restitution, in terms of books, articles, treatises, symposia and courses on restitution, is meager. Similarly, while restitution, equity and tracing cases receive considerable treatment at the highest levels of the English judiciary, US courts seem uninterested in these issues, rarely producing the theory-laden opinions that have become quite common in the House of Lords. The situation is particularly curious because restitution is generally thought to be the invention of late nineteenth-century American scholars. This article explains this divergence. I argue that the Commonwealth restitution discourse is largely a product of pre- or anti-realist legal thought which generates scepticism within the American academic-legal establishment. The article identifies the two dominant camps in American private law thought—left-leaning redistributionalists and the centre-right legal economists—and shows that neither has any use for the Commonwealth's discourse. I conclude by analysing the emerging drafts of the Restatement of Restitution and forecast the future of American restitution law.

Specifying Rights Out of Necessity

Oberdiek, J. — 2008-03-19

It is the purpose of this article to make the positive case for an under-appreciated conception of rights: specified rights. In contrast to rights conceived generally, a specified right can stand against different behaviour in different circumstances, so that what conflicts with a right in one context may not conflict with it in another. The specified conception of rights thus combines into a single inquiry the two questions that must be answered in invoking the general conception of rights, identifying the content of a right in light of what is justifiable to do under the circumstances. I present the case for specificationism in four sections, focusing on property rights. First, I argue that rights are based upon more fundamental reasons, and that this instrumentalism is compatible only with specificationism—a fact necessity cases illuminate. Next, I explain how specificationism embodies a fully moralized understanding of rights, and point to a dilemma that one faces in denying this. Third, I argue that the gap in property rights exposed in necessity cases entails that there is no right-based duty to compensate in such cases. Finally, I offer an error theory to explain the (false) attraction of the general conception of property rights.

Legal Originality

Siems, M. M. — 2008-03-19

In legal academia it is highly controversial how to ‘be original’ in legal research. This article will try to maintain an attitude of tolerance in not promoting or discrediting one particular methodology. Instead, it will identify four different ways of ‘being original’. Perhaps the most common approach is to deal with ‘micro-legal questions’. Many legal academics also pursue research in ‘macro-legal questions’. Less common but growing is the importance of ‘scientific legal research’ and research in ‘non-legal topics’.

The Normal Order of Family Law

Henaghan, M. — 2008-03-19

The Superpatriotic Fervour of the Moment

Gearty, C. — 2008-03-19