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<title>Oxford Journal of Legal Studies - current issue</title>
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<prism:eIssn>1464-3820</prism:eIssn>
<prism:coverDisplayDate>Summer 2009</prism:coverDisplayDate>
<prism:publicationName>Oxford Journal of Legal Studies</prism:publicationName>
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<item rdf:about="http://ojls.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/short/29/2/189?rss=1">
<title><![CDATA[Political Safeguards in Democracies at War]]></title>
<link>http://ojls.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/short/29/2/189?rss=1</link>
<description><![CDATA[
<p>Wartime challenges democracies both from without and within. The need to marshal resources against a foreign enemy prompts the centralization of authority which, in turn, threatens to compromise domestic liberty. This article, originally delivered as the 2008 Hart Lecture, examines the ability of democracies to survive military threat with their core liberties intact. The focus is not on the more familiar liberty versus security trade-offs, but on the ways in which divided political authority in democracies serves as a check to both military misadventure and excessive internal suppression. The article begins with a historic account of how political accountability in democracy, from Athens forward, helps explain the relative military success that democracies have enjoyed. Furthermore, even where military emergency has forced emergency measures, the longer-term result tended to be an expansion of democratic accountability, as with the grant of the franchise to those who had served. The core argument is that the political accountability of executive authority, even in times of war, has had both military and political benefits. The article then turns to an examination of the modern war on terror. Here the historic advantages of democracy in terms of citizen involvement and common enterprise are least apparent. The final sections of the article question how well our inherited institutions will perform over long-term conditions of asymmetric warfare against non-state adversaries. The final conclusion is that the new frontier of war may place greater strains on judicial oversight of executive claims of exceptional authority precisely because the political safeguards of democracy, while still critical, may not be sufficient.</p>
]]></description>
<dc:creator><![CDATA[Issacharoff, S.]]></dc:creator>
<dc:date>2009-06-04</dc:date>
<dc:identifier>info:doi/10.1093/ojls/gqp006</dc:identifier>
<dc:title><![CDATA[Political Safeguards in Democracies at War]]></dc:title>
<dc:publisher>Oxford University Press</dc:publisher>
<prism:number>2</prism:number>
<prism:volume>29</prism:volume>
<prism:endingPage>214</prism:endingPage>
<prism:publicationDate>2009-06-01</prism:publicationDate>
<prism:startingPage>189</prism:startingPage>
<prism:section>Articles</prism:section>
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<item rdf:about="http://ojls.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/short/29/2/215?rss=1">
<title><![CDATA[What is Unjust Enrichment?]]></title>
<link>http://ojls.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/short/29/2/215?rss=1</link>
<description><![CDATA[
<p>That there exists a law of restitution concerned with reversing unjust enrichments is widely considered to be uncontroversial. However, the once orthodox view that unjust enrichment explains all instances of restitutionary liability is fast becoming a minority position. Indeed, the ability of &lsquo;unjust enrichment&rsquo; to account for all restitutionary claims has been doubted by many of those who fought most strongly for its recognition as an independent head or source of liability, chief amongst these Professor Peter Birks. Because of this, while there is widespread acceptance that unjust enrichment plays <I>some</I> role within the law of restitution, there is considerable uncertainty as to what this exact role is, so much so that what is meant by unjust enrichment can be seen to be in doubt. Beginning with an examination of Birks&rsquo; understanding of unjust enrichment and the classificatory scheme into which it slots, this article addresses the question of what role a conception of unjust enrichment can and should play in presenting and justifying the law of restitution.</p>
]]></description>
<dc:creator><![CDATA[Webb, C.]]></dc:creator>
<dc:date>2009-06-04</dc:date>
<dc:identifier>info:doi/10.1093/ojls/gqp008</dc:identifier>
<dc:title><![CDATA[What is Unjust Enrichment?]]></dc:title>
<dc:publisher>Oxford University Press</dc:publisher>
<prism:number>2</prism:number>
<prism:volume>29</prism:volume>
<prism:endingPage>243</prism:endingPage>
<prism:publicationDate>2009-06-01</prism:publicationDate>
<prism:startingPage>215</prism:startingPage>
<prism:section>Articles</prism:section>
</item>

<item rdf:about="http://ojls.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/short/29/2/245?rss=1">
<title><![CDATA[Manifesting Trust]]></title>
<link>http://ojls.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/short/29/2/245?rss=1</link>
<description><![CDATA[
<p>Trust may be an important organizing idea when thinking about law. However, if trust is to be deployed usefully as an organizing idea when thinking about law, work must be done to understand what trust is, what it does and what effect it has. This article explores one aspect of interpersonal trust that may be relevant when thinking about law. The article considers how one person might manifest trust to another. In so doing, the article considers types of action that are ill- and well-suited to manifesting trust. It then considers why it might be important to manifest trust. Finally, the article suggests some lines of future inquiry by pointing to how the phenomenology of trust might be significant when assessing the sorts of claims about trust that lawyers typically make.</p>
]]></description>
<dc:creator><![CDATA[Harding, M.]]></dc:creator>
<dc:date>2009-06-04</dc:date>
<dc:identifier>info:doi/10.1093/ojls/gqp002</dc:identifier>
<dc:title><![CDATA[Manifesting Trust]]></dc:title>
<dc:publisher>Oxford University Press</dc:publisher>
<prism:number>2</prism:number>
<prism:volume>29</prism:volume>
<prism:endingPage>265</prism:endingPage>
<prism:publicationDate>2009-06-01</prism:publicationDate>
<prism:startingPage>245</prism:startingPage>
<prism:section>Articles</prism:section>
</item>

<item rdf:about="http://ojls.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/short/29/2/267?rss=1">
<title><![CDATA[Searching for the Long-Lost Soul of Article 82EC]]></title>
<link>http://ojls.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/short/29/2/267?rss=1</link>
<description><![CDATA[
<p>This article has two interrelated purposes, one of historical and one of contemporary significance. It first seeks to challenge the common view in the literature that Article 82EC is a product of ordoliberalism. This is done by directly examining the <I>travaux pr&eacute;paratoires</I> of the competition rules of the EC Treaty to discover the intent of the drafters of Article 82EC. This inquiry is important for a modernized approach to Article 82EC since it must be determined whether Article 82EC <I>can</I> be applied with a &lsquo;consumer welfare&rsquo; standard without a Treaty amendment. This is because, if the provision is &lsquo;ordoliberal&rsquo;, its objective <I>cannot</I> be the enhancement of &lsquo;consumer welfare&rsquo;. As its second and policy-driven purpose, this article suggests that the intent of the drafters of Article 82EC provides the EC Commission and the courts with the means to apply Article 82EC in a modernized manner with a &lsquo;more economic approach&rsquo;. The article shows that the drafters of Article 82EC were mainly concerned with increasing &lsquo;efficiency&rsquo;. Hence, adopting a welfarist objective would <I>not</I> imply a fundamental change in the goals of Article 82EC. On the contrary, including efficiencies in the assessment would be a late but welcome recognition since efficiency is already imbedded in the provision.</p>
]]></description>
<dc:creator><![CDATA[Akman, P.]]></dc:creator>
<dc:date>2009-06-04</dc:date>
<dc:identifier>info:doi/10.1093/ojls/gqp011</dc:identifier>
<dc:title><![CDATA[Searching for the Long-Lost Soul of Article 82EC]]></dc:title>
<dc:publisher>Oxford University Press</dc:publisher>
<prism:number>2</prism:number>
<prism:volume>29</prism:volume>
<prism:endingPage>303</prism:endingPage>
<prism:publicationDate>2009-06-01</prism:publicationDate>
<prism:startingPage>267</prism:startingPage>
<prism:section>Articles</prism:section>
</item>

<item rdf:about="http://ojls.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/short/29/2/305?rss=1">
<title><![CDATA[Collective Intentional Activities and the Law]]></title>
<link>http://ojls.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/short/29/2/305?rss=1</link>
<description><![CDATA[
<p>We ascribe the performance of intentional actions to groups. We claim, for instance, that the orchestra is playing a symphony, that a gang has robbed a bank, and so on. But what is a collective intentional action? Most accounts suggest that, for there to be a collective intentional action, at least two necessary conditions should be met. First, participants must act in accordance with, and because of, the intentions that the group perform a certain action. Second, there must be common knowledge. These accounts, however, face two difficulties. On the one hand, they are uninformatively circular, for they employ in the analysis the very notion of group-action that they are trying to elucidate. On the other hand, they are too demanding, for there are cases of collective intentional action where neither of the conditions is met. The article proposes, by developing further an account put forward by Christopher Kutz, a model of collective intentional actions that overcomes these two problems. It also suggests why such a model is important for our understanding of the law.</p>
]]></description>
<dc:creator><![CDATA[Brigido, R. S.]]></dc:creator>
<dc:date>2009-06-04</dc:date>
<dc:identifier>info:doi/10.1093/ojls/gqp007</dc:identifier>
<dc:title><![CDATA[Collective Intentional Activities and the Law]]></dc:title>
<dc:publisher>Oxford University Press</dc:publisher>
<prism:number>2</prism:number>
<prism:volume>29</prism:volume>
<prism:endingPage>324</prism:endingPage>
<prism:publicationDate>2009-06-01</prism:publicationDate>
<prism:startingPage>305</prism:startingPage>
<prism:section>Articles</prism:section>
</item>

<item rdf:about="http://ojls.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/short/29/2/325?rss=1">
<title><![CDATA[Justifying Gain-Based Remedies for Invasions of Privacy]]></title>
<link>http://ojls.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/short/29/2/325?rss=1</link>
<description><![CDATA[
<p>In <I>Campbell v MGN Ltd</I> [2004] UKHL 22, [2004] 2 AC 457 the House of Lords approved of protecting privacy interests through incrementally developing the existing action for breach of confidence. Lord Hoffmann suggested that this modified cause of action, instead of being based upon the duty of good faith, focuses upon the protection of human autonomy and dignity. This article explores how this change in underlying values affects the availability of gain-based remedies, where breach of confidence is relied upon against the wrongful publication of private information. An account of profits is generally available where a defendant profited from disclosing confidential information in breach of a pre-existing relationship of confidence. It can also be awarded for certain breaches of contractual non-disclosure agreements and to protect proprietary interests. This article argues that these existing rationales for an account of profits can, where they apply in a particular case, also support gain-based relief in a privacy context. The article then considers that the particular nature and vulnerability of privacy make it necessary to allow gain-based relief in circumstances beyond these established categories. In order to provide effective deterrence and protection against commercially motivated infringements, in particular by the media, gain-based remedies should also be available where the privacy invasion is deliberate and a particularly outrageous infringement of the claimant's rights.</p>
]]></description>
<dc:creator><![CDATA[Witzleb, N.]]></dc:creator>
<dc:date>2009-06-04</dc:date>
<dc:identifier>info:doi/10.1093/ojls/gqp005</dc:identifier>
<dc:title><![CDATA[Justifying Gain-Based Remedies for Invasions of Privacy]]></dc:title>
<dc:publisher>Oxford University Press</dc:publisher>
<prism:number>2</prism:number>
<prism:volume>29</prism:volume>
<prism:endingPage>363</prism:endingPage>
<prism:publicationDate>2009-06-01</prism:publicationDate>
<prism:startingPage>325</prism:startingPage>
<prism:section>Articles</prism:section>
</item>

<item rdf:about="http://ojls.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/short/29/2/365?rss=1">
<title><![CDATA[Fair Trials and Procedural Tradition in Europe]]></title>
<link>http://ojls.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/short/29/2/365?rss=1</link>
<description><![CDATA[
<p>This review discusses the thesis advanced by Sarah Summers in her recent book. In particular it examines the three radical claims that structure her argument. First, that the commonly used analytical distinction between adversarial and inquisitorial traditions in criminal procedure should be abandoned. Secondly, that since the Continental reforms of the 19th century, criminal procedure can best be understood in terms of a single European procedural tradition. Thirdly, that the European Court of Human Rights has misconstrued the logic of that single European procedural tradition by failing to understand that it involves the rejection of a &lsquo;determinative&rsquo; pre-trial phase. Each of Summers&rsquo; three arguments is subjected to critical analysis and ultimately rejected as innovative and stimulating but flawed.</p>
]]></description>
<dc:creator><![CDATA[Field, S.]]></dc:creator>
<dc:date>2009-06-04</dc:date>
<dc:identifier>info:doi/10.1093/ojls/gqp004</dc:identifier>
<dc:title><![CDATA[Fair Trials and Procedural Tradition in Europe]]></dc:title>
<dc:publisher>Oxford University Press</dc:publisher>
<prism:number>2</prism:number>
<prism:volume>29</prism:volume>
<prism:endingPage>387</prism:endingPage>
<prism:publicationDate>2009-06-01</prism:publicationDate>
<prism:startingPage>365</prism:startingPage>
<prism:section>Review Articles</prism:section>
</item>

<item rdf:about="http://ojls.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/short/29/2/389?rss=1">
<title><![CDATA[Law, Morality and the Egalitarian Philosophy of Government]]></title>
<link>http://ojls.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/short/29/2/389?rss=1</link>
<description><![CDATA[
<p>Herbert Hart and the positivists influenced by him have, according to Nigel Simmonds, deflected attention from the question that has always been at the heart of philosophical reflection on law. This question concerns the relationship between law and morality and how we should understand it. Simmonds argues that law and morality are necessarily related and seeks to explain their relationship by reference to an archetype that actually existing legal institutions approximate more or less adequately. He identifies this archetype as providing the basis for an analysis of law that is free from metaphysics and universally applicable. This review article raises doubts concerning Simmonds&rsquo; claims to offer a metaphysics-free and universal analysis. It also offers an argument in support of the conclusion that he has failed to point up the complexity of the positivist tradition he criticizes. While Simmonds is vulnerable to these criticisms, he throws light on an egalitarian philosophy of government that informs legal institutions in the West and is relevant to positivist analyses of law.</p>
]]></description>
<dc:creator><![CDATA[Mullender, R.]]></dc:creator>
<dc:date>2009-06-04</dc:date>
<dc:identifier>info:doi/10.1093/ojls/gqp009</dc:identifier>
<dc:title><![CDATA[Law, Morality and the Egalitarian Philosophy of Government]]></dc:title>
<dc:publisher>Oxford University Press</dc:publisher>
<prism:number>2</prism:number>
<prism:volume>29</prism:volume>
<prism:endingPage>411</prism:endingPage>
<prism:publicationDate>2009-06-01</prism:publicationDate>
<prism:startingPage>389</prism:startingPage>
<prism:section>Review Articles</prism:section>
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